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TOPIC: Impacts of regime change on urban development.

Question: when regimes changed, how much did the bureaucracy change? What progresses continue, and which really changed?

In fact this topic covers a lot of information to discuss, and I am going to briefly discuss the regime change from the period of King Amir Abdur Rahman Khan till president Karzai. And in this brief introduction some information is given on changes in institutions, economy and security. If we have a glance on the past the foreign countries were trying to have full control over Afghanistan especially the British Empire and the Russian Empire. So the British controlled a bit of it from the south and the Russian did it for the north so after a while they were defeated by the people of Afghanistan and by 1919 Afghanistan became a member of United Nations. And the fight between the two existed for a long time.

King Amir Abur Rahaman Khan (1880 – 1901) laid the groundwork for the modern Afghan state by establishing a standing army and by instituting a more efficient administration that enhanced tax assessments and collection, and improved trade, roads and basic education. He re-organized civil administration and extended it beyond the capital by dividing the country first into six provinces, each headed by an appointed governor, and then into smaller divisions and subdivisions, led were mediated by deep personal loyalties, ethnic and tribal solidarities, and Shari's and customary.

Abdur Rahman's government sought to penetrate, rather than displace, local political structure. Judges retained their posts, but became salaried and regulated councils and tribal assemblies, relying on local agents (arbobs) as intermediaries. Larger landowners, traditional leaders, and the ulema were granted wide autonomy in exchange for their cooperation.

Successor Afghan rulers gradually added to the state's administrative goals and capacity, and cautiously attempted modernization.

While much of Amir Habibullah Khan's (1901-1919) reign was spent fending off foreign encroachment and protecting royal power, he accomplished several educational and cultural reforms. He cultivated the rise of a progressive and nationalist elite, and launched the country's first genuine (be-weekly) newspaper. He opened a high school to meet the increasing manpower requirement of the central government, and founded a military academy to create an officer's corps.

Amanullah (1919 – 1929), who assumed power after his father's assassination, introduced the country's first constitution. The 1923 Constitution formed a modern executive, but kept legislative powers in the hands of the king and his seven-member cabinet. It granted virtual equality to women, abolished slavery and gave rights to non-Muslims minorities, while abolishing many traditional executive privileges and

limiting the power of religious court judges. Primary education was declared compulsory in a system of national schools, while intermediate and secondary schools were set up in Kabul and in provincial capitals. The state also subsidized industries and encouraged the expansion of trade and private investment. Municipal and provincial councils were formed for the first time. Amanullah instituted direct taxation of farmers and traders, and regular budgeting and accounting procedures. But his attempts to use state administration to impose these reforms prompted opposition from conservative religious and tribal leaders. In 1929, a Tajik peasant rebel group seized control of the capital and forced Amanullah to step down.

Mohammad Nader Shah (1929-1933) - the eldest of the five prominent Musabihan brothers – restored the rule of the royal family. He pursued a reformist agenda by promoting small-scale industry and by initiating a modern banking system in hopes of expanding foreign trade. He invested state revenues in improved civil and military administration, communications, and transport. He re-opened schools that had been closed during the 1929 rebellion, invited foreign teachers, and opened Kabul University, including a school of medicine.

After Nader Shah's assassination in 1933, his young son, Mohammad Zahir Shah (1933-1973), assumed the throne. For the next 20 years, the king's uncles ran the government and did little to further greater political expression or social innovation. Through government expenditures on education were high, second only to those for the military (about 12 percent of the total budget in 1948 – 1949), Afghanistan's 100,000 students represented less than 10 percent of school-age children, and only 20 percent of the nation's schools were located outside of Kabul. The government added faculties of law, theology, and letters to Kabul University, but enrollment remained low.

Throughout this period the state administration remained centralized, financed through indirect taxes on commercial agricultural exports including karakul, cotton, raisins, and fruit. In the 1950s, the extraction of taxes from the rural areas had declined markedly, and the revenue barely covered local expenses. This was in marked contrast to the situation that prevailed under Amanullah, when land and animal taxes represented two-thirds of government revenue.

It was the king's first cousin, Mohammad Daoud Khan, who became prime minister in 1953, who recognized a new opportunity for state expansion. Politically repressive and aggressively nationalist, Daoud prioritized economic growth and made the critical decision to accept Soviet and East European economic and military aid. Capitalizing on Cold War competition, Daoud also attracted more modest amounts of American and European assistance. Together, these foreign loans and grants, totaling more than \$1 billion covered most of the country's development projects through the mid-1960s. Such external assistance allowed the state to expand. Foreign aid and (after 1968) natural gas exports allowed the expansion of government projects and services, including education, roads, and dams, and also strengthened the military. The civil service that was approximately 10,000 employees in 1955 grew to nearly 60,000 by 1963.

Daoud also made earnest attempts at professionalizing public administration. Ministries were reorganized and preference in recruitment and promotion was given to those with foreign technical or professional training. Most officials in positions of higher authority were Persian-speaking ethnic Pashtuns, who were regularly assigned outside their home provinces. However, officials sent to rural areas often viewed the

local population with contempt, a feeling reciprocated by villagers who considered the government's representatives overbearing and corrupt.

Provincial and local administrations also become more functional during this time. The country's regions, provinces, division, districts, and sub districts were headed by governor-generals, governors, commissioners, district governors, and alagadar. The provincial governors, who exercised considerable autonomy, were appointed directly by the prime minister; all administrative heads were named by and responsible to the central government. The country's districts became its key contact. In a step toward popular participation, cities of more than 10,000 were allowed to elect city councilmen and mayors every four years. However, the provincial governments could veto candidates and, in practice, the elections were not uniformly held.

Central government powers were also expanded in tribal areas, though actual government control varied. Government garrisons were posted only to the larger administration units, making implementation of government policies elsewhere difficult and sporadic. For example, in more remote areas, the government made no effort to collect taxes, and tribal governance continued unimpeded. The still sizeable nomadic community was linked to government administration only tenuously. Several large eastern tribes that straddled the Pakistan border retained many of their own military, economic, and administrative functions. Among other prominent tribes, many of their leaders were co-opted, brought to Kabul, and given sinecure posts in the executive or the military. Some were appointed as governors, but always to provinces other than their own.

For all of his accomplishments, including educational and modest cultural reforms, the autocratic Daoud was ill-equipped to pursue any of the far-reaching initiatives advocated by expanding urban, educated elites. More pointedly, it was Daoud's "Pashtunistan" policy – agitation in favor of irredentist claims on Pakistan – that closed the border, disrupted trade and precipitated King Zahir Shah's decision, in 1963, to take the reins of government away from his prime minister.

The 1964 Constitution

In 1964, King Zahir Shah convened a loya jirga (grand assembly) to ratify a new constitution that envisaged a constitutional monarchy with a bi-cameral parliament comprising a popularly elected lower house and a partially elected upper chamber. Though the powers reserved for the king were less than democratic, those elected from the country's districts were given an opportunity to participate in the state's decision-making process and accorded wide access to the bureaucracy in Kabul. In addition, the constitution's expansion of civic rights and protection of minorities went far beyond any previous provisions.

The laws and regulations that followed reinforced the centralized administrative and fiscal nature of the government structure. Officials working in the country's 27 provinces were to work closely under Kabul's supervision. Provincial and district administrations were designed as miniature replicas of their respective ministries in Kabul, bringing to the countryside programs affecting economic development, education, health, and culture. Though they did not always follow Kabul's orders, they did maintain regular relations with the central government by sending weekly, monthly or quarterly reports to their ministries, and by asking for instructions from the center on issues they could not solve. Though the constitution allowed for district councils (shuras) or consultative bodies, the law establishing them was never passed and the concept was not applied in all parts of the country.

In 1964, Afghanistan also witnessed improvements in irrigation, agricultural modernization, increased enrollment in basic and higher education, and investment in small and large industry. To handle the increased funding and activity, the central government underwent enormous growth, expanding to 15 ministries (eight concerned with development activities alone), and creating state institutions such as banks, construction and insurance companies, two regional development agencies, a national airline, and new higher educational institutions in public health and the sciences.

For all of the development gains, however, the 1964 Constitution's democratic experiment was foundering. Successive governments were unable to address mounting economic and social problems or deal with a politically radicalizing urban population. Legislative paralysis arrested social and administrative reforms. What few laws came into being were enacted during the parliament's recesses by government decree. Such promised legislation as land reform and a progressive income tax were never addressed. Corruption and nepotism were widespread.

Judicial administration reform offered a somewhat brighter picture. The formal court system had become visible in the larger cities and provincial capitals, and the associated legal cadres of judges, prosecutors, and attorneys were gaining prominence. Inspired, in part, by the 1964 Constitution, judicial administrators emphasized both modernization and respect for traditional Islamic jurisprudence. Progress in resolving the incompatibilities between customary and religious legal norms and secular law in new legal codes was leading toward co-existence in a dual legal system, though in practice, administration of justice was often indiscriminate, inappropriate, and biased. Even so, the strides made in judicial administration set a positive example for other Afghan political institutions and suggested that many of the excesses in Afghan democracy could be moderated.

The Daoud republic and the communists

Increasingly polarized politics stagnation, and a crippling drought during 1971-1972, set the stage for the return of Daoud to power in a military-led, communist-assisted coup in 1973. Abolishing the 1964 Constitution and the monarchy, Daoud declared Afghanistan a republic with himself as president. Daoud soon distanced himself from the socialist idea that originally motivated backers of the coup. He sought instead to broaden and intensify relationships with other Muslim countries, even while repressing the country's Islamists. By reaching out to Iran and Pakistan as well as the Arab states, Daoud hoped to attract development financing and lessen his country's now 20-year economic dependence on the Soviet Union.

Most government structure was kept largely intact. Bureaucrats speak fondly of this period as a time when the basic administrative systems worked comparatively smoothly and when some serious efforts were made to reduce corruption. This included significant amendments to civil service legislation of 1970 that created the basis for a transparent and coherent system of public employment.

The same year, Daoud proposed a new constitution to replace the "pseudo-democracy" of the monarchy with a "new democracy". In reality, Daoud had little interest in expanding domestic freedoms. He allowed only one political party, appointed a cabinet of sycophants and friends, and failed to implement a strong development program. The communist factions, in particular, felt bitter and marginalized, and united to mount anti-government demonstrations and, with support from the pro-Soviet military, staged a full-fledged coup in April 1978, Killing Daoud.

The new communist regime, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, aimed to reform Afghan society and reorient its economy. Using inherited administrative structures but classic Marxist rhetoric, the communist government decreed a wide range of programs that included land reforms, elimination of landless peasant's debts, and equal rights for women. However, the government underestimated the alienating effect these reforms would have on a conservative population, which perceived them as socially and economically disruptive and a threat to traditional culture. Populations were further antagonized by the dispatch of young party activists to the provinces and by the communists' use of military backed political repression that include arbitrary arrests and detention, secret trails, and executions without trial. Localized revolts, most carrying the banner of Islam, broke out in the summer of 1978 and soon spread throughout the country.

With the Afghan army near collapse and the communist leadership in disarray, the Soviet Union sent troops to Afghanistan in December 1979 to subdue the rebellion and defend its perceived regional strategic interests. Amin, who was never fully trusted in Moscow, especially after ousting Taraki, was killed in the takeover. The invaders installed Babrak Karmal, a communist with a reputation for loyalty to his Soviet patrons, as prime minister. Karmal, the Soviets naively assumed, would soon be able to accommodate the government's enemies and stabilize the country.

By the early 1980s, much of the countryside stood outside the central government's effective control. Kabul continued to appoint governors, but their full writ extended only in the vicinity of provincial capitals. Most districts and villages were under the influence of Islamic mujahidin factions, strongly supported by Pakistan, the United States and Saudi Arabia. As the state structure gradually crumbled, various nongovernmental organizations and the U.N. delivered basic services to the populations by forging direct relation with local leaders and mujahidin commanders, and creating de-facto decentralization.

Determined to neutralize the opposition, whether by force or enticements, Moscow sought fresh leadership in Afghanistan, and installed Najibullah, former head of the secret police, as president in November 1986. Najibullah introduced a new constitution the following year that was intended to put a more politically pluralistic, Islamic face on the government. Though Soviet and Afghan militaries devised new tactics against the mujahidin, they made little headway and, in 1988, peace accords in Geneva were signed that specified a timeframe for the Soviet army's withdrawal.

Mujahidin and Taliban rule

The last Soviet troops departed Afghanistan in early 1989, leaving the Afghan communist regime to struggle on in a civil war. Without its benefactor, Najibullah's government survived longer than expected, but eventually collapsed in April 1992. An interim mujahidin government took control of Kabul, while regional militias, financed by foreign backers, arms smuggling and drug trafficking, took over most of the rest of the country. Over the next four years, the state largely ceased to exist, control of the capital, while anarchy reigned elsewhere. Militia leaders and regional warlords exacted road taxes and transit fees from cross-border traffic, and engaged in various other forms of extortions, including kidnapping. During mujahidin's regime many new districts and sub-districts were created by the warlords. The delivery of food from international aid organizations and the U.N. became indispensable.

Order was largely restored and authority centralized with the emergence of the Taliban. However, the Taliban showed little interest or aptitude for governing aside from enforcing their strict, uncompromising notions of Islam. The Taliban leadership

appointed relatively few people to administration, except in the areas of security and law enforcement. In Kabul, most major services such as water, sanitation, health and food deliveries were handled by aid organizations.

The only institution-building enterprise considered by the Taliban, the construction of a gas pipeline, never progressed. Negotiations with an American-Saudi consortium during the mid-1990s to build the pipeline and bring revenues to the government and jobs to the economy were stalled for security and political reasons. The completion and operation of the pipeline would require that the Taliban defeat their opposition in the north and pacify much of the country. The already risky foreign investment became a political target for those who viewed any agreement as an unconscionable sanctioning of Taliban rule.

Post-Taliban rule

The Taliban's ouster in November 2001 left the newly installed Afghan authorities with the major goals of restoring security and directing the country's rehabilitation and reconstruction. Following the signing of Bonn Agreement on December 22, 2001, an interim administration was established under the leadership of Chairman Hamid Karzai. This was replaced by a transitional authority and the appointment of Hamid Karzai as president, following the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002. The Bonn Agreement reinstated the provisions of the 1964 Constitution, unless they were amended by the Bonn Agreement itself.] [A Guide to Government in Afghanistan by Anne Evans, Nick Manning, Yasin Osmani, Anne Tully and Andrew Wilder, \(2004\) Published in USA](#)

[So the above mentioned changes in regimes had impacts on urban development and here I will only explain about the recent regime-change impacts.

What the recent regime-change caused in field of urbanization was that 63,000 private homes were destroyed by fighting and about 60% of its roads were destroyed. It means in Kabul city 63,000 families became homeless in mujahidin's period. And this change also caused an acute unemployment rate in Kabul which was deteriorating the economical situation of the country. So these causes really stopped the urban development of Kabul and other provinces, and had a lot of negative impacts on the institutions which were not only dealing with urban development but also other institutions. For example, the bad economical situation made the staff of institutions leave their jobs and go somewhere else for finding some money in order to be alive and also be safe. So these offices remained with a few number of professional staff, and this situation allowed some nonprofessionals to cover the vacant positions which came up with unsatisfying outcomes.] [Shaping Urban Futures by Jo Beall and Daniel Esser, \(March 2005\) Published by AREU.](#)

[During Soviet Union these institution were trying to organize a system in which they could program urbanization in a systematic process, which they did it successfully to some extent. But fifteen years after collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 the devastating reverberations of the cold war continued to infect the country.

The recent few decades have witnessed major political changes marked by the shifts from communism to capitalism, the realignment of alliances, and renegotiations and impositions of regional and global power. This has resulted in a series of localized civil wars along with pre-emptive wars of occupation in new struggles for power. The resultant shattering of civil society and the demolition of cities, which are a nature focal point of conflicts, has brought on a strange new urban phenomenon on epoch of

continuous destruction and reconstruction that generates specialized global and local industries that thrive off the process.

This shift has also brought a lot of changes in the replacement of high ranking staff. It means those who were the decision makers in communist's regime were all replaced by new staff and only those who were low ranking staff they have had their previous positions.] *Abuld Khaliq Namat, Deputy, Ministry of Urban Development, Sun. 17th June 2007*

[If we analyze the present government it is widely involved in reconstruction of cities and has no information of internal situation of governmental institutions, so it is recommended that the process of reconstruction of Afghanistan should ideally include the construction of institutions, laws and regulations, systems of social and economic welfare, together with the infrastructure of cultural identity. All too often, however, the expectations of reconstruction are expressed purely in terms of physical reconstruction. That being said, and with all the resources available there is still a dearth of large-scale reconstruction in the city. Apart from the highway projects, which were actually implemented to provide easy access for military quick-response teams, and the millions being spent on new facilities by the coalition forces in Bagram and NATO in Darluman, there is scant infrastructure or large-scale urban reconstruction that is a direct result of institutional or international intervention. On the contrary, as some have predicted, the real drive in the construction business that is changing the face of the city are the activities of the private sector, in its rush to build in the current lawless situation. In this context where anything goes, development is haphazard, unregulated and without control or interference from the state. Therefore, as long as there is enough money and enough connections (whether legal or, as is all too often the case, illegal) to support the process, the development of real estate continues in this unplanned and uncontrolled manner, accommodating those who can afford it or those with the strength to bypass rules and regulations. The construction industry in Afghanistan currently thrives in four main sectors: major military-related projects subcontracted to foreign companies (which are seen as safe in the current climate of distrust); small-scale government projects usually subcontracted to relatives or for hefty kickbacks: the dramatically growing private sector that is funding large-scale development, with funds that are sometimes dubious and sometimes legitimate; and small-scale developments in retail and residential premises. The lion's share of the construction is contracted out to foreign companies, which are mostly Turkish but are also Indian, Chinese and Central Asian in origin. These organizations, while channeling money out of the country, also exacerbate the inefficient technical skills of local companies that are struggling for the leftovers. This lends itself to the increase of illegal contracting procedures locally and the further anger of local contractors.

It could be argued that the hype of reconstruction has had more of a real impact of Kabul than the process of reconstruction itself. The myth of a reconstructed Kabul has caused a mass influx of Afghans returning from Iran, Pakistan and other countries which had absorbed the Diasporas. This influx has overwhelmed the city. People returning and expecting to find programs and assistance to help re-establish them in Kabul all too often find themselves abandoned with no support beyond their own means. As a result, makeshift container and tent settlements have emerged throughout the city, creating instant ghettos. Even before the outbreak of twenty-three years of war, the city of Kabul had already become swollen to its maximum capacity. The

current in-migration of returnees and refugees has drastically increased the burden on an already overpopulated and devastated city. It is estimated that of the 3.7 million people currently living in Kabul, 58 per cent live in informal settlements with very limited, if any, services available. In 2003-2004, an estimated 500,000 – 1 million returnees have arrived in Kabul alone. With nearly 40 per cent of its buildings destroyed in the war, barely existed sewerage systems, sub-standard streets and roads, Kabul is in desperate need of a new urban infrastructure as well as the thorough upgrading of that which does exist. In response to these overwhelming conditions, a certain progressive technocratic wing of the Afghan government is pushing for the creation of a new satellite city on the fringes of Kabul. The plans for this development, which are intended to address the mass influx of people arriving in the city, have been rendered useless by the realities on the ground that range from obstacles such as armed men shooting at survey teams to the lack of underground water sources to ensure its sustainability.

The complexity of overlapping intentions and often conflicting desires of the diverse participants of Kabul's urban development, such as the local government, military forces, warlords, criminals, squatters, international donors and locals, has created a three-dimensional matrix of uncertainty and chaos imposed on the political, ethnic and geographic landscape of the city. This confusion produces a city in constant flux, changing and rearranging itself by the minute, often in opposing directions. Daily movements through the city are experienced as a series of random blockages, road closures, security barriers and new temporary constructions, causing vendors to rearrange themselves constantly along the changing streets – manipulations that can ultimately result in alienating the public from its urban environment. Kabul has become a maze of confusion, experienced as wild juxtapositions of diverse and often conflicting programs. Large areas of the city become unrecognizable from one day to the next. While these changes sometimes reveal the potential to see the city anew, it also can have enormous negative consequences on the psyche of the population, who increasingly feel like alienated outsiders in their own home city.

In post-conflict environments (or, more specifically, those that experience less conflicts than before) like Kabul, there is a lack of such basic amenities as stability, security, established governing institutions, the availability of materials, technical construction knowledge, reliable transportation and the lack of a strong central control mechanism. All this raise the question of how cities may actually get reconstructed under such circumstances. The answers are critical for establishing an apparatus for the development and co-ordination of the private sector who are the major players in the redevelopment of the city. The complex specificity of intricate local networks and knowledge, which changes from day to day, are essential for ensuring the future growth of a city that reproduces itself without any direction. In such scenarios, mass discrepancies emerge between an ideal vision of an organized plan for moving into the future and the stark reality of what is possible within the chaos of the city. The everyday life of people struggling to exist and move forward, forced to the margins of an unpredictable economy and its effects on the urban condition, is all too often littered with stumbling blocks that are developed to help advance the rich and powerful while ignoring and undermining the efforts of the disenfranchised. Yet in a year of elections and political wrangling that needs, at least for the sake of appearances, to look legitimate, the power of public opinion has given the local poor an unexpected

weapon.] *City Edge by Esther Charlesworth part #07 Rebuilding Kabul Ajmal Maiwandi and Anghony Fontenot published in USA*

Conclusion

Kabul is a city of fragments held together by an invisible collective web, spun by divergent groups ranging from warlord to non-governmental organizations to government officials to destitute widows with children. Occupying the blurry periphery of the faint planned vision of the city's future, in an attempt to make sense of the overwhelming void of economy, normality, security and health, occupants of the city fluctuate between euphoric moments of inventive entrepreneurship and hopelessness. This spectrum of rapid juxtapositions of highs and lows is indicative of many processes currently at work in the city. The differences and the reality of how a city actually develops through various complex, fragmentary, contradictory and incoherent individual acts establish the possibilities of its urban potential.

Currently there are no master plans to debate, no large-scale initiatives to critique. What emerges from this void are fragments of urban schemes, independently pursued, which make up Kabul's current reality. This process inhabits a space where anything goes, where a variety of every scenario imaginable occurs. In Kabul, the city center has become a wild-west zone filled with ministries, compound blocks, free-for-all markets, restaurants, factories, uncontrolled waste collection and security barricades. We experienced unchecked or illegal high-end commercial development next to illegal squatter development, the hell of barbed wire and AK47s, traffic jams of up to an hour per kilometer, lorries, carts, dogs, cats. Wholesale businesses use the rooftops for mass storage, multi-storeyed blocks are filled with recycling materials, naked children bathe in the polluted and waste-infested river, ditches are filled with shit and the rank smell of stale and dried piss. This maelstrom of urbanity in decline is the context within which the reconstruction of everyday life unfolds.

[Abdul Ahad Wahid, Ministry of Urban Development, June 11, 2007 at 4:30mp](#)

Reference list

Books:

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People:

1. *Abuld Khaliq Namat, Deputy, Ministry of Urban Development, Sun. 17th June 2007*
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