Evolution of Air Pollution Policies in Two Political Contexts:
Consequences for Los Angeles and Mexico City
Written forResearch Paper for Comparative Urban Policies
Manuel Castells, Professor
January 20, 1993
In this paper I investigate the development of air pollution policies
by the American and Mexican governments, and the effects that these
policies have upon the spatial form of Los Angeles and Mexico City,
respectively. Air pollution policies in Los Angeles are being developed
within a privatized capitalist economy, through a series of very
powerful regulatory agencies that are partly autonomous from both the
state and federal governments. Air pollution policies in Mexico City
are being implemented within a system which is state-capitalist.
However, the economic structure of Mexico is being privatized by the
same government which is implementing significant clean-air policies in
Mexico for the first time. The comparison of policy development within
these two political contexts helps reveal which explicit and implicit
policies have been adopted, and the political choices which have been
made in the process of policy development. The comparison is also
useful for assessing the effects of these policies upon their
respective urban environments.
The Advent of Air Pollution Policies
Severe urban air pollution has occurred in industrialized American
cities for more than a hundred years. However, air pollution was
identified as a problem that governments could and should ameliorate
only after the establishment of both public health policies and
fundamental understanding of atmospheric chemistry and dynamics. After
the Second World War, both the causes and the potential solutions to
urban air pollution began to be discovered. For instance, Dr.
Haagen-Smit, an organic chemist at the California Institutue of
Technology, demonstrated in 1951 that hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides
react photochemically to produce smog. In 1952, the 'killer fog' in
London dramatically illustrated that urban air pollution can be a
serious public health hazard: roughly four thousand people died from
causes linked this five-day episode of severe, low-level air pollution.
The broadly-based popular consensus that goverments should act to
prevent the degradation of the environment gained political force
during the 1960s. Air pollution was one of the primary issues, and in
the United States, Congress responded by ratifying the Clean Air Act
and forming the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970.
President Echeverria of Mexico also enacted a Federal Law for the
Prevention and Control of Environmental Contamination in 1971, in
anticiparion of the first United Nations Conference on the Environment
in 1972. Environmental protection was considered politically irrelevant
in Mexico at the time, and this first law remained unimplemented for
lack of political will or public pressure. However, Echeverria tried to
establish Mexico as a leader in environmentalism among Latin American
countries, at least in intention if not in action.(1)
Several policy approaches have been used by governments since they
first engaged directly in reducing urban air pollution. The initial
'command-and-control'-style policies were characteristically
technocratic, and often very expensive. American policy history up
through the 1970s typifies this style of legislation. 'Command' meant
laws and penalties: over the past twenty-two years the U.S. has enacted
a battery of regulations to address every specific source and type of
pollution. The first laws had substantial results: open-air trash
burning was banned, which dramatically reduced particluates. The ban
also dramatically increased the size of landfills, simply shifting
pollution from the realm of airborne policy jurisdiction to the (then)
much more lenient realm of solid-waste management policies without
necessarily reducing pollution overall. Power plants were required to
reduce sulphur, hydrocarbon, and nitrogen oxide emissions, which led to
a general conversion from coal-fired to oil-fired power plants, as well
as our tentative affair with nuclear power generation.
'Control' means technological solutions, such as unleaded fuel and
catalytic converters for cars, and multi-stage combustion systems in
power plant boilers. Automobiles and factories with big smokestacks
were two obvious sources of pollution, and the first basic
differentiation in types of air pollution regulation was between
stationary and mobile sources.(2)
Stationary point-source (known as 'end-of-the-smokestack') regulations
are usually tailored for each specific type and source of emission.
Over the years the number and complexity of control rules has become
immense, and the process of developing new rules is slow. Established
industries resent a legal system that constrains them, while new
industries can operate unhampered by government until appropriate rules
are developed. Environmentalists complain that control measures cannot
be developed fast enough to keep up with either new industires or
changes in the processes of existing industries. Furthermore, critics
point out that command-and-control-type regulations only address the
problem of air pollution at the moment that the pollution is generated,
without challenging the underlying patterns and practices that result
in the generation of air pollution in the first place.(3)
On the bright side, the early era of air pollution regulation in this
country did establish clear standards of air quality. Furthermore,
policy makers are learning how to create new kinds of policies by
understanding the shortcomings of the command and control approach.
Two new methods have been adopted by American policymakers in the last
six years, one for development of more effective policies, and the
another to reduce the cost of policy implementation. To develop policy,
American regulators have begun to use exposure-based criteria rather
than emission-based criteria. To implement policy, regulators are now
developing incentive-based methods to replace or augment the
traditional proscriptive means of enforcement.
The exposure-based method of air pollution policy development arose
from a reexamination of the fundamental purpose of such policies: to
protect the health of the public. On reconsideration, we are not
directly concerned with the quantity or toxicity of emissions, nor are
we actually concerned with the quality of the air for its own sake. We
are most directly concerned with breathing polluted air, and the
consequences of those inhalations upon our health. The conceptual
distinction between emission-based and exposure-based policies may seem
slight, but it has profoudly affected the way we now conceive of air
pollution regulations. An example is the relatively new concern with
indoor air pollution and 'sick' buildings. Since Americans spend most
of their time in buildings and automobiles, most of the air that we
breathe is indoor and in-car air: this, specifically, is the air that
directly affects our health. We may inhale more pollutants from
secondary cigarrette smoke and carpet adhesives than we do from nearby
heavy industries.(4)
Using market incentives to encourage private businesses was first
proposed more than forty years ago. However, the legal mechanisms for
implementing "smog exchange" programs were only approved Congress in
1990 through amendments to the Clean Air Act.(5) The AQMD has just
gained approval to develop a pollution-rights exchange program last
year, and they are in the process of setting up the system with the
businesses that will be involved. Basically, polluters will be allotted
a certain number of pollution 'credits' based on historic levels of
emission of nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, and sulfur oxides. Each type
of gas will be treated separately, so three 'exchanges' will operate
simultaneously. Every year the number of credits allotted to that
company will decrease by a fixed percentage. However, companies will be
able to sell or buy credits from each other, so that the overall
quantity of emissions will decline, but within the overall allowance,
companies can negotiate with each other to reduce at varying rates by
whatever means they choose, depending upon the relative cost of
emissions-reduction to each company.
Numerous problems exist with this program: how are 'historic levels of
emission' established? How will small businesses be protected from the
deep pockets of the bigger corporations, or will they simply be bought
out of operation in short order? Supposedly, the system will save on
the public cost and hassle of administering cumbersome
command-and-control regulations. But will the exchange process be any
more efficient to administer? Won't this new system still have to be
enforced by inspection, just as air-quality regulations always have
been?
The impact of the pollution-exchange program upon the urban environment
remains uncertain, as the rules are still being negotiated. It is
therefore beyond the scope of this paper.
Los Angeles was not so environmentally fortunate as other American
cities. The tendency for thermal inversions to trap air in the Los
Angeles basin is now world-famous, along with the legacy of the
automobile-oriented planning policies that prevailed during the era of
Los Angeles' massive growth. The result of these natural and manmade
conditions is that nearly ten million cars are driven one hundred
million car-miles per day within a volume of air which can remain
stagnant over the city for several days. Furthermore, Los Angeles
experienced the mixed blessing of sustained industrial growth
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, in an era when general
deindustrialization across most of the U.S. made it even easier for
older American cities to meet federal air quality standards set by the
EPA. To deal with air pollution in Los Angeles, a combination of local,
regional, and federal agencies operate sometimes in conjunction,
sometimes in opposition to each other in the effort to someday make the
air over Los Angeles comply with federal standards on a regular basis.
The main air pollutants of concern in both Los Angeles and Mexico City
are nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, sulfur oxides, particulates, and
toxins. The smog resulting from the photochemical reaction of
hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides is only one but the most notorious of
these pollutants, both because it can be seen and because the gases
that create smog are produced by the everyday automobile. It is
symbolic of our mutual complicity and culpability in generating air
pollution. Ozone, the invisible component of smog, is also destructive
on a wide scale. Ozone damages human lung tissue, and the leaves and
fruits of many plants: crops such as tomatoes, lettuce, string beans
and cucumbers are no longer grown in the Los Angeles air basin because
ozone damage either kills them or renders them commercially useless.
The California Air Resources Board conducted a study of lung damage in
young adults by examining the lung tissues of accident and homicide
victims. Nearly all of the victims showed some degree of chronic
bronchial irritation, and "about one-third of the subjects had some
degree of chronic interstitial pneumonia, a form of the disease found
deep within lung tissue."(6)
Each of the major air pollutants is generated by a variety of types of
activities. Although the relative contribution of each activity to a
given type of pollution has been inventoried, polluters are not simply
asked to reduce their contribution to the problem on an equal basis.
One reason is that the costs and social implications of of reducing
pollution can vary widely depending upon the type of activity; another
reason is that different agencies have jurisdiction over mobile and
stationary sources of pollution.
The sources of nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons exemplify the
complexity of the problem. The two gases are produced by cars, trucks,
trains, ships, and aircraft (mobile point sources); by oil refineries
and power plants (stationary point sources); by lawnmowers, lighter
fluid, and drying paints (non-point sources); by bakeries and fast food
restaurants; by furniture makers; and by any manufacturer who cleans
products with solvents, from Hughes Aircraft to the maker of childrens'
eyeglasses and medical instruments.
Ironically, personal care products have recently become a significant
source of both gases as product manufacturers have replaced
chlorofluorocarbons with nitrous oxide and propane as propellants in
aerosol cans. They may be helping preserve the upper ozone layer and
its uv-absorbing capacity, but they are also contributing to the
generation of ozone near the earth's surface, where it is highly
destructive to living organisms. A similar variety of types of sources
that produce particulates and toxins makes the reduction of all of
these pollutants an extremely complex undertaking.
Policy Development in Los Angeles
By the late 1960s, policy makers in Southern California were well aware
that they faced a uniquely difficult situation. Dr. Haagen-Smit began
his illustrious career as the 'father of smog' by searching for a
mysterious disease that was damaging crops in the Los Angeles area in
the late 1940s; hence his first discovery of the effects and sources of
ozone. In 1968, the state combined the Bureau of Air Sanitation (formed
in 1955) with the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board (formed in
1960) to create the statewide Air Resources Board, and Dr. Haagen-Smit
was named as the Board's first director. The primary task of the Board
is to regulate mobile sources of pollution and set overall air quality
standards for the state, while local Air Pollution Control Districts
have responsibility for stationary sources.
During that same year Congress began deliberating on air quality
legislation that would become the Clean Air Act. The Air Resources
Board sent James Birakos, spokesman for the Los Angeles Air Pollution
Control District, to negotiate for the right of California to enact
separate, stricter legislation. When the Clean Air Act was ratified by
Congress in 1970, California was unique in that it was granted autonomy
to develop policies and laws independently from the federal EPA. ARB
policies had to be approved by the EPA, but until recently this
stipulation has proven to be only a formality.(??)
In 1977 the Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District was reorganized
and expanded into the South Coast Air Quality Management District
(SCAQMD or AQMD for short), and Birakos was appointed the District's
first director. AQMD has jurisdiction over metropolitan Los Angeles and
the air basin that it occupies, including Los Angeles and Orange
Counties, the western portion of Riverside, and the southwestern
portion of San Bernardino Counties. SCAQMD still accountable to the
California Air Resources Board, and thereby ultimately to the federal
EPA. The result of this multilevel regulatory structure is a
distribution of both authority and accountability which is essential to
the process of air polluton policy development in Los Angeles.
SCAQMD negotiates directly with businesses, utilites, and local
governments in order to develop policies which are appropriate and
responsive to the situation in greater Los Angeles. Since many
activites generate each of the primary components of Los Angelean air
pollution, polluters who can organize into lobbying groups try to
emphasize the relative importance of their activity, and the
difficulties they face in trying to reduce their share of emissions.
Large businesses such as oil companies and military contractors exert
tremendous pressure on the AQMD, to make compromises that serve their
interests. For instance, a local manufacturer like Hughes, Lockheed, or
Arco can make a convincing argument that excessive regulation will make
business unprofitable for them; forcing them to move operations out of
the region. This will (and has) cost thousands of local jobs and hurt
the local economy. Corporations argue that if tighter regulations are
applied to automobiles, utilities, out-of-state trucks, ships, or other
(smaller) businesses, they could be granted relief. Local city and
county governments are prone to side with the major employers in their
communities, who provide their tax base. Local authorities also resist
the idea that any regulatory agency should have the right to interfere
directly in their affairs, usurping local autonomy.
Therefore, AQMD is prone to strike compromises and develop
less-than-ideal policy proposals. These proposals, however, must pass
the review of the Air Resources Board in Sacramento, somewhat removed
from the pressures of powerful local lobbies. The subtle difference
between being a part of the Air Resources Board and being accountable
to the Air Resources Board becomes extremely important in this
negotiating process. No doubt, local authorities and business leaders
appreciate having an autonomous local agency that is responsive to
their particular needs and problems, but if they force the AQMD to
compromise too much, then the ARB will send them back to negotiating
table to strike a legally acceptable compromise.
Enforcement of air pollution policies in California continues to be
effective because the Air Resources Board is not only administratively
autonomous from the Federal government; it is also fiscally autonomous
from both the federal alnd state governments. The ARB receives $6 from
every automobile registration fee; it also receives various payments
from companies that use air-polluting substances, in the form of
surcharges for use of the substances and from large fines for
noncompliance. Fiscal autonomy makes the ARB relatively immune to
short-term political compromises and fiscal crisesin California,
including the present one. The EPA, on the other hand, has suffered
considerably over the last twelve years under a federal administration
unsympathetic toward environmental protection. The Reagan
administration drastically reduced the budget of the EPA, crippling the
agency's ability to enforce the very laws that it had created. This
loss of federal-level backing could have undermined the authority of
the ARB; instead, the Board has continued to fund and conduct primary
research into new ways of reducing pollution on its own, while the EPA
has languished. In fact, over the last twelve years the ARB has
superseded the role of the EPA to a large degree in that other states
have begun to look to the California agency as the leader in air
pollution policy develoment in the United States.(8)
The Community Right-to-Know Act and the Air Quality
Management Plan
Despite the attitude and intentions of the federal administration, air
pollution policies in Los Angeles gained tremendous force, publicity,
and notoriety in the late nineteen-eighties. Congress reacted to the
Bhopal disaster by passing the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to Know Act in 1986. The Act requires businesses to publicly list
toxic and polluting substances that they use, and to prepare
risk-assesment plans to their neighboring community about the dangers
that the business might pose.(9)
In that same year a federal judge ordered the AQMD to develop a plan by
which Los Angeles could achieve compliance with the Federal clean air
standards by 2007. The intervention of the federal court into the
process of air pollution policy development began in 1983, when Mark
Abramowitz filed suit in Federal court against the EPA for failing to
protect his health by enforcing the Clean Air Act in Los Angeles. The
Act specifies that all cities must comply with federal air quality
standards, which Los Angeles consistently fails to do. Abramowitz won,
and in 1987 the Ninth Circuit court ordered the agencies directly
responsible for air quality in Los Angeles to implement a plan that
would reduce pollution levels to meet federal standards within twenty
years.
The responsibility for developing this plan fell to the AQMD. Over the
next two years they developed the Air Quality Management Plan which was
approved by the ARB in 1989, despite tremendous resistance from
businesses and local authorities. In this instance, ARB delayed
approval of the plan until the AQMD could demonstrate that it had the
general agreement and cooperation of all the parties that would be
involved in making the plan succeed, including oil companies, power
utilites, manufacturers, and local governments. AQMD took the
negotiating stance of being caught between a rock and a hard place:
their personal contacts in Los Angeles might be able to demonstrate the
hardships that they would suffer under tighter legislation, but the
AQMD's ability to compromise was constrained by the federal court order
Whether one regards the AMQD as being caught between a rock and a hard
place, or whether that rock was simply a rhetorical bludgeon that AQMD
used to pummel the hard place into compliance is a matter of
interpretation and opinion.
The Right-to-Know Act has been an effective tool of policy
implementation by entirely different means than the explicit
recommendations of the AQMP. Once businesses were required to publicly
disclose the toxic and polluting substances that they use, many
businesses decided to reduce or eliminate the use of such substances
out of embarrassment and concern about public reaction in their local
community. No inspections, no fines, no court cases were required.
Industries not only have to disclose which dangerous substances they
use, but they must also prepare an assessment of the risks their
operation poses to the surrounding community. Therefore, local zoning
and planning commissions will be able to judge the potential
noxiousness of industries with much more precision.
At the same time, the increasing cost of using toxic (and therefore
regulated) substances is making environmentally-sound substances more
cost-effective. The most important of these is the substitution of
water for petroleum-based solvents in paints, adhesives, and finishes.
Since water-based industrial products have become cost-effective, many
small industries have become essentially non-polluting, such as
furniture makers.
Mexican Policy History
Today Mexico City has the worst urban air pollution in the world. In
the last six years the severity of the pollution in Mexico's capital
has gained worldwide notoriety, due to the deaths and frequent
hospitalization of shcoolchildren during the winter months, when
thermal inversions in the Valley of Mexico are most severe. Like Los
angeles, Mexico City is situated in an air basin surrounded by high
mountain ranges. However, the floor of the valley is more than seven
thousand feet high, and the thinness of the air makes combustion less
efficient. Because of the relative scarcity of oxygen, the same car
would emit more hydrocarbons in Mexico City than in Los Angeles. But
the cars, in fact, are not the same: until 1991, automobiles in Mexico
were not required to include emission control devices that ensure
complete combustion of hydrocarbons, nor was unleaded gasoline
available in Mexico City until 1990. Hence, only about one out of five
residents of Mexico City, but automobiles were the source of about
eighty per cent of the air pollution over the city in 1990. Lead has
become so concentrated in the capital that in a recent study, 70% of
newborn infants had unnacceptably high levels of lead in their blood.
During recent winters, ozone concentrations have occasinally risen
three times as high as the acceptable maximum level set by the World
Health Organization, and have often risen to double the standard limit.
Respiratory ailments have become a leading cause of death in the city.
Much of the pollution in Mexico City is a consequence of the Federal
Government's sustained policies of economic development and
centralization. In 1946, President Miguel Aleman embarked on a campaign
of rapid industialization, which has remained a high priority for every
succeeding president. During the 1970s the government succeeded in
substantially expanding the industrial sector, especially in Mexico
City. Economic growth meant, up until 1981, a rising standard of living
for Mexicans. Increased purchasing power means that proportionally more
Chilangos--residents of Mexico City--can afford to buy cars. Automobile
ownership in Mexico City is increasing at an even greater rate than the
urban population as a whole.
Episodes of severe air pollution began to gain publicity in the winter
of 1985-1986. However, serious concern about environmental degradation
had arisen by the beginning of the decade. When Miguel de la Madrid
assumed the presidency in 1982, he promoted the powerless and
insignificant environmental undersecretariat that Echeverria had formed
in 1971 into a full secretariat. By combining it with the , de la
Madrid institutioalized the link between environmental protection with
issues of urban development.
Unfortunately, de la Madrid was never able to implement his
environmental program. The debt crisis of 1981 preoccupied most of his
six-year term, as he tried to mitigate the economic damage and comply
with austerity measures imposed by foreign lenders. However, de al
Madrid laid the groundwork for his chosen successor, Carlos Salinas de
Gortari. Not only did he form SEDUE, but he also enacted a new General
Law for Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection in the last
year of his presidency. EPA officials compare this law favorably with
comparable U.S. regulations.
Carlos Salinas de Gortari
Like his predecessors, President Salinas is heavily committed to
economic development. If he succeeds in his effort to obtain a North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the economy of Mexico may grow
tremendously in the future. Salinas may follow through with his
intention to require new industries to locate outside of the Valley of
Mexico, but if his economic programs succeed, the resultant growth in
the economy will enable an even larger proportion of the Mexican
population to afford automobiles.
Unlike his predecessors, though, Salinas faces unprecedented challenges
to his authority and legitimacy from both an emergent political
opposition led by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas and the Revolutionary Democratic
Party (PRD), and from the environmental crisis in Mexico City itself.
These challenges have both forced and enabled Salinas to implement
rigorous air pollution policies in Mexico City for the first time.
The elections were a powerful demonstration of the Mexican peoples'
disenchantment with the party of Salinas and his predecessors, the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). The purchasing power of the
average Mexican declined by half between 1980 and 1988 due to the
tremendous foreign debt incurred in the 1970s, and subsequent austerity
measures imposed by foreign lenders.(11) The resulting decline in the
average living standard certainly contributed to the unhappiness of
many Mexicans. However, public dissatifaction was also directed against
the chronic corruption of the PRI, and, in Mexico City, against the
failure of the government to act on environmental issues: in the
Federal District, even the PRI admits that Salinas did not win the
majority of the presidential vote.
Nationwide, Salinas only received 50.3% of the vote, and his election
as president was only conceded reluctantly by Cardenas and the PRD. The
authority of both Salinas and the PRI as a whole were extremely
vulnerable at the moment that he assumed the presidency. Salinas' first
act, therefore, was to establish his personal credibility by acting
quickly, dramatically, and symbolically against corruption: he singled
out Joaquín Hernández Galícia, the head of the powerful and corrupt
national oil workers union. By arresting "la Quina," Salinas not only
succeeded in establishing his personal reputation, he also sent a clear
message to private businesses that he would not protect organized labor
or favor state enterprises.# Furthermore, the crackdown was the first
of several steps that Salinas would take to transform Petróleos
Mexicanos from an intransigent and entrenched state-owned monopoly into
an instrument for implementing his environmental reforms.(12)
Salinas is committed to environmentalism for a number of reasons. Like
his presidential predecessors Etcheverria and de la Madrid, Salinas
recognizes the importance of progressive environmental policies in
promoting the prestige of his administration both domestically and
internationally. Not only does he want to present Mexico as a leader
among Latin American nations; he wants to transform Mexico's reputation
into that of a first world nation.
Salinas is also very sensitive to issues and pressures in the United
States, because above all else, he has staked his political future (and
possibly that of his successors) on the NAFTA. American businesses want
Mexico to adopt comparable regulations for their own industries, so
that Mexican products will also have to include the increased costs of
clean production processes. The incoming Clinton Administration is
pushing for stricter environmental legislation as a conditon to
implementing NAFTA not only because of their ideological convictions,
but because of public sentiment and the highly directed pressure of
non-governmental organizations such as the Natural Resources Defense
Council and Greenpeace.
Salinas is in a better position to implement environmental programs
than his predecessors because of a growing public consensus that
something must be done by the government to improve the environmental
situation in Mexico City. In fact, the political future of Salinas'
successor, Manuel Camacho Solis, depends upon it. Following PRI
tradition, Salinas has handpicked his protégé, and appointed him as
mayor of Mexico City. Solis' performance in this post will either
generate or destroy the public support he will need to succeed Salinas
as President. In an unusual move, Solis has decided to stay on as mayor
for six years rather than the usual three: in staking his political
future on his success as mayor, Solis seems to be betting that
successful handling of urban problems in the capital; and as the
Mexican press says, that means that his future "is in the air." The
marriage of political futures to environmental reform was underscored
by Salinas' appointment of Luis Donaldo Colosio, former the head of the
PRI, as Secretary of SEDUE. Along with Solis and the Secretaries of
Education and Trade, Colosio began to be considered a potential
successor to Salinas only after he had been given this now-prestigious
post.(13)
Subduing Pemex
Salinas gained the full cooperation of Pemex through two strategic
acts. First he closed the Eighteenth of March refinery on its namesake
day in 1991, and then he restructured Pemex following the Guadalajara
disaster of April 1992. Like his crackdown on the oil worker's union,
Salinas' closure of the Eighteenth of March refinery was charged with
symbolic meaning. One of the largest and oldest refineries in Mexico,
it had symbolized Mexico's sovereignty from its powerful neighbor and
enemy to the north. The refinery was named for the day that President
Cardenas nationalized the oil industry, wresting control from American
investors in 1937. The refinery also represented aging, polluting
industry, though: out of 35,000 industries emitting 15% of the
pollution in Mexico City's air, the refinery alone emitted more than a
quarter of that fraction.
By closing the refinery, and especially by firing all of the workers
outright rather than finding new jobs for them, Salinas reiterated his
message to the company: downsize. Overall, Salinas fired 20,000 Pemex
employees in 1991, and 30,000 in the previous two years, paring the
monopoly down to only 150,000 employees.(14)
The explosions of sewers in Guadalajara on April 28 and 29, 1992 killed
almost two hundred people. The public soon found out that Pemex had
been dumping volatile wastes into the city sewers; the monopoly was
disgraced by the incident. Salinas took this opportunity to restructure
Pemex.(15) Exactly what he did to the leadership within the company is
unclear, but an AQMD executive who has worked with SEDUE for several
years marvels at how eager Pemex executives are to cooperate with or
even initiate environmental programs now.(16)
Experts both in Mexico and outside agree that, aside from the change in
the power relationship of Pemex and the government, Salinas'
restructuring of the organization was primarily cosmetic. Ostensibly,
Pemex was broken up into four units: exploration and production,
refining, gas and basic (Necessary) petrochemical products, and
secondary petrochemical products. An breakup of the company be helpful
in allowing the sectors of the company to be more flexible and relocate
outside the Valley. If Pemex is actually broken up and privatizated,
which economists expect if NAFTA goes through, may also mean that the
Mexican government will lose its one effective means of implementing
environmental policies through the company: by owning a controlling
interest in it.
It seems extremely unlikely to me that Salinas or any future president
would privatize Pemex, because the federal government is financially
dependent upon it. In 1991 Pemex paid 90% of its profits--$15
billion--to the federal treasury. The government, in turn, only alotted
$3.2 billion to Pemex for investment in 1992; not enough to enable the
company to build a new refinery. Without the funds to invest in its
physical plant, the company cannot relocate refining out of the Valley
of Mexico, nor can they substantially improve the cleanliness of their
operations within the Valley. Furthermore, Mexican investment laws do
not provide a high level of security to foreign investors. Therefore,
upgrading and relocation of facilities cannot even be underwritten by
foreign investment. As an indicator of the low level of foreign
investors' confidence, one sector of Pemex--secondary petrochemical
products--has been open to foreign investment for six years, and
private firms have only invested in the production of four out of
fifty-two products open to investment. However, investors seem to
consense that the climate for investment--in Pemex and overall--will
improve substantially if the NAFTA is agreed upon.(17)
The 1990 Plan
While working behind the scenes to gain control of Pemex, Salinas also
enacted sweeping programs to reduce air pollution in Mexico City as
soon as possible. Many new regulations, therefore, were diercted at
reducing and mitigating the effects of automobile use. The ability of
the Mexican government to enact laws infringing upon civilian life as
well as businesses was used to its best advantage. Salinas had already
enacted the Day-Without-a-Car program in 1989, requiring everyone to
leave their car at home for one day of the working week, and on certain
weekend days. In the 1990 plan, he announced that the ban would be
extended to two days a week during severe smog episodes, and that
certain industries would subject to the same type of program. Other
steps included reducing the sulphur content of diesel fuel by 80
percent by 1993, and increasing production of unleaded, 92-octane
gasoline. The government hopes that by 1994, 49% of gas used in the
metropolis will be unleaded. Further measures included expanding the
subway, streetcar, and trolleybus system; replacing 1,750 city buses
with cleaner-runnung vehicles; improving city access roads, ring roads
and traffic lights to reduce congestion; expanding suburban parking
lots to encourage public transportation to the city; expanding
anti-contamination checks on all vehicles; and convering delivery
vehicle engines from gasoline to natural gas.
In the plan, Salinas also required industries that use fuel oil to
switch to more expensive diesel fuel. As it happens, Mexico's domestic
oil fields happen to be high in sulfur, and therefore so is Pemex's
fuel oil. Mexico also has significant reserves of natural gas, and
Salinas had originally intended to require industries to convert to
this very clean fuel. Unfortunately, Mexico City does not have a
network of pipelines to distribute natural gas, and it is considered
prohibitively expensive to install. Therefore only electrical utilities
will begin converting to natural gas for the time being.(18)
The plan also calls for planting 170 million trees.
Reforestation in Mexico City
In addition to the types of pollution which Angelenos face, Mexicanos
also breathe disease-laden airborne dust. During the winter, strong
winds (tolvaneras) are a mixed blessing: they break up the thermal
inversion layer, alleviating the smog; but they also pick up tons of
contaminated dust from street and landfills. The root of this problem
lies in the high cost of municipal infrastructure. As with the subway
system and natural gas distribution network, the Mexican government
simply cannot afford the cost of extending the road paving and sewage
systems fast enough to keep up with the rate of growth of Mexico City.
Therefore, human waste is left to dry on the streets, especially in
unrecognized squatter areas where there are few municipal services at
all. Sunlight effectively kills most fecal microbes, and turds quickly
break down into dust. Unfortunately, a few hardy germs can survive
sunlight and dessication: e colii, hepatitis, and certain amoebic and
protozoan parasites such as giardia. They are spread along with the
rest of the dust.(19) Angelenos, like Chilangos, suffer from chronic
irritation due to airborne particulates, which make the lungs more
susceptible to infection; but in Mexico City, infections may come from
the dust itself.
The long term solution to airborne diseases and dust in Mexico City
will be to drain and pave the existing urban environment, and to
continue extending these services as the city expands. Considering the
current economic condition of Mexico, the first objective will be
exeedingly difficult to achieve; and to keep up with the pace of urban
growth may be virtually impossible.
For the time being the Mexican government seeks to reduce airborne dust
by reforesting the city. Trees stabilize the soil and break the
wind;(20) they are also relatively inexpensive to plant and a visible
symbol of governmant action. However, trees are often cut down to
provide both building material and cooking fuel; therefore, the
government maintains an incentive program trhough follow-up inspections
of planted trees. Each year a government inspector will reimburse
residents who have maintained trees planted upon their property(21)
Eventually, such a cash-incentive system will fail either because so
many trees will have been planted that regular inspections will become
unfeasible. Or, the value of the trees will become so great to their
owners that the cash incentives needed to convince an owner to keep a
tree standing will become unfeasibly large. Perhaps if the city plants
trees along its own rights-of-way and protects them by threat of fine,
the city-owned trees might become large enough to provide substantial
protection on their own by the time the private trees have become too
valuable to protect.
The Solidaridad Program
In another astutue policy decision, Salinas linked privatization of
industries with government provision of services in the very popular
Solidaridad program. The program consists of building infrastructure
with capital obtained from the sale of state-owned enterprises. Salinas
stands apart from his predecessors in that he does not equate
industrialization with economic development. Presidents Echeverria and
Lopez-Portillo nearly brought the country to financial ruin by
borrowing heavily from foreign lenders to carry out industrialization
programs in the 1970s. In this respect he agrees with American
economists; whether both are right remains to be seen.
Overall Effects of Air Pollution Policies
Regulating Automobiles
Automobile use stands out as one of the most problematic activities
because of both the tremendous amount of pollution generated by
automobile use and the great difficulty which regulators face in trying
to either reduce or fundamentally alter automobile use. Ultimately, air
pollution policies that affect use of the automobile will have the
greatest impact upon the urban form of Los Angeles, and a substantial
effect upon the urban pattern of Mexico as well.
The social implications--and political challenges--of enacting
automobile regulations in Mexico contrast sharply with the situation in
Los Angeles. In Mexico City, only a wealthy minority can afford to own
a car. So to restrict cars is to impose upon the lifestyles of the
wealthiest, most influential class in Mexico, which happens to be
concentrated in the one region of the country where restrictions on the
use of the automobile are most needed. This unfortunate coincidence has
made it politically hazardous to enact restrictions upon automobile use.
However, President Salinas began the Day-Without-a-Car program in 1989,
and the public has been very supportive. In 1994, Mayor Solis will also
enact a program banning cars over ten years old from the city. The
regulations are archetypically command-and control, but they may be
more effective than comparable regulation in Los Angeles. An
exceptinally high proportion of very old automobiles are still being
driven in the Los Angeles area, one third of them being old enough to
predate most or all emission control devices. But the only program that
has been implemented to remove older cars from circulation was small,
voluntary 'cash-for-clunkers' program by Unocal.
The Day-Without-a-Car program may be much more effective than its
closest Los Angelean counterpart, the AQMD's program to get larger
employers to reduce trips generated by employees commuting to work. The
Mexican program is intended to reduce all intraurban journeys by one
fifth. The effectiveness of the Mexican program is weakened by those
who buy an additonal car to circumvent it, and because trips that can
be made on any given workday, such as shopping, are not reduced but
simply rescheduled. Nonetheless, Hoy No Circula must give all
automobile drivers pause to reconsider their dependency upon
automobiles. The inconvenience of that one--and occasionally two--days
out of five is far more likely to induce Chilangos to modify their
commuting patterns than any program which American agencies are likely
to be empowered to implement.
On the other hand, the day-without-a-car program will increase the
class distinction between those who can and cannot afford to own cars
in Mexico City. Only the very wealthiest Mexicans can afford buy a
second car to use on the day when the first one cannot. The banning of
ten-year-old cars discriminates against those who have just barely
enough money to afford one used car.
Another purpose of both of these measures is to reduce traffic
congestion. Until recently, both the public and the government would
have assumed that it is the governments' role to alleviate traffic, by
building more roads and increasing the carrying capacity of the road
system. By asking and encouraging the public to drive less, governments
have begun to depart from a strictly utilitarian view that they are
obliged to maintain infrastructural services simply in resronse to
public demand. Although government agencies will continue to be under
tremendous public pressure to maintain and upgrade traffic networks,
this pressure is now counterbalanced not only by the usual financial
constraints, but also by the new governmental obligation to weigh the
environmental consequences of aiding and abetting an increase in
automobile use.(23)
The Return of the Electric Car?
The AQMP requires automakers to begin selling a minimum proportion of
low-emission vehicles out of the total number of vehicles that it sells
in the Los Angeles market. The precedent for this type of request was
the ARB's requirement that catalytic converters be included in all cars
sold in California in the early 1970s. The automotive industry
complained bitterly at the time, but the California market--indeed, the
Los Angeles market alone--is so large that they were unwilling to give
up their share, and they complied.
Acceptable alternative fuels, for the time being, are compressed
natural gas, propane, and methanol, or electric cars. Preparations to
accommodate widespread use of electric automobiles are being considered
by municipal planners. For instance, businesses may be required to
provide electrical outlets in employee parking areas, since with
existing battery technology, electric cars have to be recharged a trip
of any significant length.
A major shift to the use of alternative-fuel vehicles will not
substantially cahnge the patterns of either air pollution regulation or
automobile use. However, widespread adoption of electric cars would
have several effects: the first will be a shift in the method and
location of energy generation, and a corresponding shift in the types
of air pollution policies applied. Electricity is normally generated at
large, fixed-point power stations, be they coal, oil, gas, uranium,
sun, or water-powered. Even fusion power, if it can be harnessed for
commercial use, is likely to be contained within large, stationary
facilities.
Methods of monitoring the pollution generated from electric power
stations is very different from the process of monitoring and
regulation of emissions from hundreds of thousands of private
internal-combustion engines. Stationary, point-source emitters are
usually a large companies, which are more easy to regulate and make
publicly accountable.
The adoption of both electric cars and low-emission vehicles is also
likely to change the way that the urban environment is perceived and
used. Electric automobiles are slower, and propane and compressed-gas
cars are restricted in range, but neither of these shortcomings should
be a problem for daily commuters in the Los Angeles area. It does,
however, have a symbolic difference, which may make it difficult to
popularize electric cars and sell them to the Southern Californian
public.
Those who use alternative-fuel cars may have to live closer to work,
but the change in residential location relative to workplaces can
easily be accommodated within the existing built pattern of the city. A
much more important impact will be that electric car users will have to
keep the number of daily trips to a minimum, to allow for recharging.
Whether current employment practices will accommodate this need is
another matter.
Air Pollution Policy and Land Use
In Los Angeles, air pollution policies will most directly affect urban
spatial patterns by altering land use regulations and practices. The
Air Quality Management Plan is the first program in the United States
in which an agency created to mitigate urban air pollution has
explicitly included land-use policies as a necessary component for
achieving its goals. When the SCAQMD was in the process of adopting its
air quality management plan, the state-level Air Resources Board
refused to give it final approval until "the AQMD could demonstrate
that it had commitments from cities and counties to make sure tht all
of their decisions affecting growth, zonong, housing, transportation
and other planning actions conform with the Air Quality Management Plan
and do not interfere with the basin's progress in attaining the Clean
Air standard."(24)
The power to control use of land is one of the pillars of local
authority in the United States, so any such plan is likely to meet with
fierce resistance. Previous air quality plans had included conformity
provisions, but "a number of local governments fear that this time the
AQMD may usurp control enjoyed by cities and counties to develop and
grow." Of these local planning agencies, the Los Angeles County
Department of Regional Planning is one of the most powerful; and their
reaction to the plan was "the Department opposes the use of the Air
Quality Plan to assault local land use planning and regulatory
authority."(25)
The extension of the authority of the AQMD into specific, physical-form
issues is a very awkward, unpopular process, illustrated by a conflict
that arose between the AQMD and the Southern California Association of
Governments (SCAG). In the fall of 1989, the state legislature intended
to increase automobile-license fees by four dollars each in order to
raise funds for street improvements. The improvements were specifically
intended to make traffic move more efficiently in order to reduce air
pollution, not necessarily to 'alleviate traffic.' Since AQMD was
responsible for smog abatement, the legislature decided to channel the
funds through them, not through any of the various levels of agencies
normally responsible for roadway maintenance and improvements. SCAG
members resented this decision, since they were the governmental body
vested with the responsibility for coordinating planning with the
cities and counties of greater Los Angeles. Furthermore, SCAG directors
were elected officials whereas the AQMD board is appointed by the
governor; and it was suddenly being given the funds to implement
programs should be the responsibility of the SCAG.(26)
Last year the AQMD required a proposed mall in the San Fernando Valley
to be reduced in size, because the environmental impact analysis of the
proposal demonstrated that the mall would generate too much traffic.
The leaders of the community in which the mall will be located objected
bitterly, citing the loss in potential tax which the AQMD was imposing
upon them. The incident illustrates an issue which is not often
expressed in the current jobs-housing debate in Los Angeles: the scale
of retail and workplaces. A common criticism of residential communities
is that the physical separation of homes, shops, and workplaces
literally forces residents to use cars in order to lead a functional
life. A common reply from community leaders is that they want
employment and retail in their community, because it brings tax
revenue. However, retail shopping in America has become highly
centralized, planned in much the same was as large industrial
installations. Immense parking areas, signage, and proximity to
freeways are all intended to make shopping centers equally accessible
to residents from a large geographic area. Both retail and industry in
America are likely to be designed in this pattern, and even an
interspersal of such installations in all communities so that jobs and
housing are brought into balance on a regional scale may not reduce the
number of trips made.
A change in the pattern of trip generation
At present Americn regulators are intent upon reducing the use of
automobiles in Los Angeles. The easier component of this problem to
regulate companies which produce automobiles, and to reduce the number
of journeys to work by regulating employers who generate commute trips.
The more difficult component of this problem is to reduce the length of
journeys to work, or the elimination of any commutes by car.
Theoretically, if workplaces and residences are integrated at the scale
of individual buildings and city blocks, we will have created an urban
environment in which it is at least possible for all commutes to be
made by foot or bicycle.
This is, however, based on an obsolete assumption that the jobs-housing
balance can be conceived of as teh need to shorten the distance between
homes and workplaces, or homes, workplaces, and transportation. One
home, one workplace. Employment patterns in America have changed
radically in the last fifteen years, though, and now both partners in a
household usually work at outside, paid employment. Each is also likely
to work more than one job or to freelance, as employers try to avoid
paying full-time work benefits. The spatial relationship between jobs
and workplaces have become far more complex.
As a result pollution regulators must not only overcome the resistance
of local authorities in their effort to transform urban land use
patterns, they will also unlimately have to push for changes in labor
practices and regulations, to reduce the number of jobs that people are
forced to hold. Far from the straightforward problem of the shortest
distance between three points (the third being shopping), today the
problem of reducing the number and length of trips has become more like
finding the line of best fit in a multiple-regression analysis, in
which regulators have only partial or indirect control over some of the
variables to improve the fit, and no control over others.
Effects of regulation on the location of industry.
In the United States, heavy industry companies are moving certain
components of their operations out of Los Angeles. Full-scale
relocation is costly because of personnel and local contacts; however,
if a company has staff and property somewhere outside of the basin, it
is easiest to move the most polluting segment of a production process
to places that have looser regulation.
Shell, for instance, has stopped refining oil in the basin altogether.
This is a significant move since Long Beach is one of the major
shipping ports on the entire west coast, and Los Angeles is one of the
largest gasoline markets in the United States. Shell will rely on
shipping and refining in the Bay Area and the Pacific Northwest, and
bring fuel to Los Angeles by truck. Yet again, a step taken to
accommodate air pollution regulation is simply a shift in regulatory
regimes: in this case from AQMD's (stationary source) to ARB's (mobile
source). At the moment, ARB's emissions regulations for trucks are
somewhat lenient, and the overall reduction in emissions was probably
lessened by the switch in practice. Hughes Aircraft has moved its
helicopter assembly line to Arizona, outside of California's regulatory
realm altogether.
The impact of air pollution policies upon industries in the Valley of
Mexico is even more pronounced. Salinas and Solis have unequivocally
demanded that entire industrial sectors, such as foundries and
smelters, leave the Valley. When they requested pollution-reduction
plans from each major industry in the city in 1989, some companies
(such as Pemex) did not bother to respond. Solis simply closed the
industries down, and only let certain industries resume operation once
they submitted satisfactory plans. This surprise move eliminated any
question as to whether certain dirty industries would be allowed to
continue polluting under some form of grandfather clause. Again, the
eighteenth-of-March refinery was the biggest, and one of the oldest
single industries in the city, and neither its symbolic significance
nor the political power of its parent company were able to shield the
plant from closure. Pemex must now expand its refining capacities
somewhere outside of the Valley of Mexico.
Seasonal Use of Mexico City
Until government policies begin to alleviate pollition in the capitol,
those who can do something about it will. Wealthier residents of Mexico
City may soon be relocating outside of the city on a seasonal basis as
in mideval Italy, where the upper class would move out of cities during
the unhealthy summer months. In Mexico City, wintertime is the
unhealthy season. Thermal inversions become most severe, and pollution
is concentrated in the lowest air layer, at ground level. To protect
the health of children, the National Union of Parents has called for
school systems to reverse their seasonal schedule and have the long
break during the winter months. At present, business leaders already
provide air conditioning systems for the schools which their children
attend. Some families only remain in the capitol for the sake of their
childrens' education, since the best schools are located in the city.
Given the opportunity, though, many families would leave the city.(27)
The trend in Los Angeles, however, is more of a change in the nature of
economic activity toward a headquarters and service-sector The emergent
social-spatial model which Castells proposes pertains more fully to Los
Angeles than to any other American metropolis: on the one hand, it is a
physical locus of one or several nodes in a space of flows shared by
the élite informational brokers ; on the other hand, an immense,
disconnected, economically irrelevant underclass. The information-based
economic sector can continue to thrive in Los Angeles, unhindered by
current air pollution regulations or any stricter regulations likely to
be enacted in the future. As an example, several corporations now share
executive satellite offices, located in or near communities where
executives live in the Los Angeles area. They can do so because many of
the tasks which executives now perform require very little material
support: a chair, a desk, a personal computer, and a modem.
Aside from infomation and the clerical work that supports it, the only
two sectors of the economy in Los Angeles that seem to be unaffected by
air pollution restrictions are the garment inductry and import-export
distribution throught he ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. At the
moment it is difficult to predict, but the garment industry may soon
move to Mexico as a consequence of the NAFTA. Distribution, meanwhile,
will eventually be restricted by regulations on pollution generated by
ships, trucks, and freight trains. Two other ports: Oakland and San
Diego, will also face the same restrictions, but Vancouver, Seattle,
Portland, and soon a number of Mexican ports could take up the
share.(28)
Conclusion
In conclusion, air pollution policies are having a profound effect upon
the urban forms of both Mexico City and Los Angeles. Los Angeles has a
longer history of industrialized air pollution, and policies to
mitigate the pollution. However, policies which are having a
significant effect upon urban spatial patterns only began to be
implemented in the mid nineteen-eighties in both cities.
Structurally, a state capitalist system would seem to be ideally suited
for implementing command-and-control style regulation. In Mexico,
however, the political and administrative centralization of the
government hindered the implementation of policy, because no branch of
the government can act independently to implement policies that
threaten or conflict with the highest priorities of both the President
and the PRI. The political system remains fundamentally unchanged: what
is different, at the moment, is that environmentalism is one of this
president's highest priority. Enforcement therefore tends to be very
visible and symbolic, but only as effective as is possible without
disrupting his economic reforms.
Ironically, Salinas engaged in a vigorous program of privatization and
decentralization which will weaken the government's ability to directly
intervene in pollution-controlling activities through its direct
control of industries; yet Salinas has established such a high level of
credibility and authority that he can push through far more substantial
air pollution policies than his predecessors.
Just as the implementation of air pollution policies in Mexico City
began with Salinas, it is possible that they will end with the same
leader. To reduce air pollution in Mexico City, as in Los Angeles, will
require substantial changes in urban form and the personal lifestyle of
the residents. Both of these changes will be difficult and costly, and
neither government may succeed. In Mexico City, though, the stakes are
higher. If the government does not substantially increase the extent of
public services, the health of the public, rich and poor, will remain
in jeopardy. With the resurgence of cholera and tuberculosis in other
New World cities, the need for the provision of sanitation has become
urgent. A severe epidemic or clear indication of the degradation of
public health in the capitol could lead to the defeat of the PRI in the
upcoming elections. No matter which party is in power in the future,
though, the public demand for government action will persist as long as
the pollution remains severe; and Salinas' commitment to environmental
programs is setting a precedent against which the performance of any
future administrations will be gauged.
In the United States, the high degree of authoritative autonomy of each
of the branches of government enable each agency to pursue the
implementation of policies even if elected officials or special
interest groups protest or disagree with the importance of the
objectives. In Los Angeles, the very means by which air pollution
policies are conceived of and implemented is a case study of
institutional decentralization. Furthermore, business and
environmentalist advocates are highly organized, and able to put
tremendous pressure on the regulatory agencies from both sides; hence,
the regulatory agencies operate in a condition of sustained political
tension. Although slow and limited in its powers when compared to the
dramatic steps taken by the Mexican government, the regulatory
structure in Los Angeles has proved to be durable even when it does
conflict with the interests of elected officials at both the local and
national levels.
The effect of air pollution policies upon spatial patterns, especially
factors of industrial location and intraurban movement are contributing
to the transformation of Los Angeles into an informational city.
Perhaps some economic growth will come from the effort at accommodating
air pollution itself: Los Angeles is now the world leader in many forms
of environmental technology. Engineers from Southern California Edison
and regulators from the AQMD have been called upon to consult on
projects and policies around the world, including Mexico City. Yet even
this expertise is part of the information sector, though, and is not
likely to employ many people. As for the 'surplus labor force' of
millions who are at best peripheral and at worst irrelevant in the
information-based economy, their fate is unclear, and fortunately
beyond the scope of this paper.
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orders Environmental Protection Agency to proceed with pollution
control plan in Los Angeles, California) Wall Street Journal (Fri, July
3, 1992):B3.
"Agency urges changes in air-quality rules in Southern California."
Wall Street Journal (Mon, August 10, 1992):A5A.
Baron, David S. "Urban air quality litigation under the Clean Air Act:
past, present, and future." Environmental Law Reporter, 20:10216-21
June 1990.
Roumasset, James A. and Kirk R. Smith. "Exposure Trading: an approach
to more efficient air pollution control." Journal of Environmental Econ
and Management. 18:276-91 May 1990.
Morris, David. "A dirty city fights to come clean." (Los Angeles, CA
air quality plan) Utne Reader, n48 (Nov-Dec, 1991):34.
"A drastic plan to banish smog; Los Angeles seeks to clear its smudged
skies by the year 2009." Time v133, n13 (March 27, 1989):65.
Gawronski, Francis J. "S. California proposal calls for alternative
fuels." Automotive News, n5215 (Jan 11, 1988):6.
Cowley, Geoffrey. "Fill'er up with methyl: turning the fight against
smog into a joy ride." Newsweek v113, n18 (May 1, 1989):67.
IV. Mexican Policy.
Griffin, Rodman D. "Qualified democracy." (a dictatorial government
camouflaged to appear as a democratic government; Mexico's Emergence)
CQ Researcher v1, n11 (July 19, 1991):502.
Griffin, Rodman D. Ongoing problems. (social, economic, and
environmental problems; Mexico's Emergence)(includes related article)
CQ Researcher v1, n11 (July 19, 1991):506.
Robinson, Linda. Mexico's new revolution: President Salinas uses free
enterprise to drive his country into the modern age. (Carlos Salinas de
Gortari) U.S. News & World Report v111, n2 (July 8, 1991):38.
Simon, Joel. "Salinas repeals the revolution; Mexico's free traders."
Nation v252, n24 (June 24, 1991):842.
Russell, James W. "Free trade and concentration of capital in Mexico."
Monthly Review v44, n2 (June, 1992):23.
Scott, David Clark. "Mexico shake-up rattles environmentalists."
(ministries to be reorganized) Christian Science Monitor v84, n111
(Mon, May 4, 1992):6.
Industries
Scott, David Clark. "New smog plan for Mexico." (President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari's Ecology Pact delivers ultimatum to Mexico City's
industries) Christian Science Monitor v84, n85 (Fri, March 27, 1992):7.
Holman, Richard L. "Mexico moves to cut pollution." Wall Street Journal
(Wed, March 25, 1992):A9
Darling, Juanita. "Cabinet shifts in Mexico stir politicians." (cabinet
consolidation by President ) Los Angeles Times v111 (Fri, Jan 10,
1992):A5.
Darling, Juanita. "Mexico City's trucks, buses must convert to clean
fuel." Los Angeles Times v111 (Wed, Feb 12, 1992):A1.
Darling, Juanita; Stammer, Larry B.; Pasternak, Judy. "Can Mexico clean
up its act?" (environmental impact of U.S-Mexico commercial treaty)
(The Free-Trade Dilemma, Part 1) Los Angeles Times v110 (Sun, Nov 17,
1991):A1.
Scott, David Clark. "Mexico City tackles herculean pollution,
population pressures." (includes City's vital statistics) (Mega-Cities;
Part 1) Christian Science Monitor v83, n230 (Wed, Oct 23, 1991):10.
Miller, Marjorie; Darling, Juanita. "Mexico is radically shifting its
economy and ideology. The nationalist, state-run model is out. The free
market is in. But there are costs." Los Angeles Times v110 (Tue, Oct
22, 1991):H1.
Moffett, Matt. "Monterrey sides with Mexican president; industrial city
benefits from Salinas's economic reforms." Wall Street Journal (Mon,
May 22, 1989):A12
Moffett, Matt. "Urban quandary: Mexico City's subsidies present stiff
challenge to President Salinas; high cost hurts bid to revive economy,
but a cut risks unrest in angry populace; a spray-painted thank-you."
Wall Street Journal (Tue, Jan 10, 1989):A1.
Advent of Salinas.
Larmer, Brook. "Glasnost in Mexico: old guard takes perilous steps."
Christian Science Monitor v80, n109 (Mon, May 2, 1988):1.
Branigin, William. "Top Mexican candidate pledges risky reforms:
Salinas offers opening to other parties." Washington Post v111 (Thu,
May 12, 1988):A23.
Harrison, Lawrence E. "Leading Mexico out of dictatorship." Washington
Post v111 (Wed, June 22, 1988):A23.
Schneider, William. "Salinas to open Mexico for markets, rival
politics." Los Angeles Times v107, secV (Sun, June 26, 1988):1
Miller, Marjorie; Williams, Dan. "Two aides of presidential candidate
in Mexico slain." (Cuauhtemoc Cardenas; Francisco Xavier Ovando; Roman
Gil Heraldez) Los Angeles Times v107, secI (Tue, July 5, 1988):1
Moffett, Matt. "Mexican politics seems forever transformed by close
3-way vote: ruling party's Salinas may be new leader, but validity of
vote will cast shadow; pending problems for U.S." Wall Street Journal
(Mon, July 11, 1988):1
Cornelius, Wayne A. "Mexico's one-party system is dead: Salinas must be
his own man, igniting reform from ashes." Los Angeles Times v107, secII
(Tue, July 12, 1988):7
Rubio, Luis. "No room for compromising with Cardenas' big-government
policies." (Cuauhtemoc Cardenas', Carlos Salinas de Gortari's economic
programs) Los Angeles Times v107, secII (Tue, July 12, 1988):7
Williams, Dan. "Salinas widens his lead in Mexico tally; voters take to
streets in protest; Clouthier concedes defeat." (Manuel J. Clouthier)
Los Angeles Times v107, secI (Tue, July 12, 1988):6
Kandell, Jonathan; Moffett, Matt; Solis, Dianna. "Mexico's apparent new
president faces a series of challenges to his legitimacy." Wall Street
Journal (Wed, July 13, 1988):15
Castenada, Jorge G. "Mexico's hand is to the fire; Salinas must
accommodate a surprising surge from the left." Los Angeles Times v107,
secII (Wed, July 13, 1988):7
Orme, William A., Jr. "Salinas declared winner in Mexico; official
results give ruling party candidate 50 percent of vote." Washington
Post v111 (Thu, July 14, 1988):A21
Williams, Dan. "Salinas received just 50.3% of vote, final tally
shows." Los Angeles Times v107, secI (Thu, July 14, 1988):1
Branigan, William. "Mexican launches election protest campaign; more
than 200,000 attend rally; fraud alleged in July 6 vote." (Cuauhtemoc
Cardenas) Washington Post v111 (Sun, July 17, 1988):A1
Riding, Alan. "Salinas is facing the economic facts; the voters' point
is taken." New York Times v137, sec4 (Sun, July 17, 1988):E2
Miller, Marjorie. "Mexicans stage mass rally against PRI." Los Angeles
Times v107, secI (Sun, July 17, 1988):4
Moffett, Matt. "Embattled leader; new Mexican president is in political
jeopardy before taking office; winner in a disputed tally, Carlos
Salinas must search for a national following; Harvard and a farmer's
hut." Wall Street Journal (Wed, Aug 31, 1988):1
Rohter, Larry. "In Mexican politics, a lame duck isn't so lame;
transitions are often rough, even within the ruling party." New York
Times v138, sec1 (Sun, Oct 23, 1988):6
Miller, Marjorie. "Corruption scandal challenges Mexico
President-elect." Los Angeles Times v107, secI (Sun, Oct 30, 1988):6
Miller, Marjorie. "For Mexico's new leader, power will have limits."
Los Angeles Times v107, secI (Thu, Dec 1, 1988):1
1. The fight with Pemex
Cohen, Roger. "Latin Boss: Mexican labor leader wields power to test
President-Elect Salinas; La Quina, head of oil union, runs big business
empire that drains the economy; what Pemex means to nation." Wall
Street Journal 212:1+ September 27, 1988.
Farquharson, Mary. "Pollution plan targets community." Business Mexico
6:50 December 1989.
Reinhold, Robert. "Mexico says it won't harbor U.S. companies fouling
air." (environmental standards for companies in Mexico to be tightened.
New York Times v140 (Thu, April 18, 1991):A1
V. General considerations of Air Pollution Policies upon
Urban form.
A. Automobile use-patterns
Renner, Michael G. "Car sick: where emission standards are strict--as
in the U.S.--overuse of automobiles is still leading to the poisoning
of air, water, and people." World Watch 1:36-43 Nov/Dec 1988.
Nowell, Gregory P. "the Air Quality debate in California: should
gasoline be banned?" Energy Policy 18:652-60 S 1990.
"Federal and state officials last week signed a multiyear research
agreement with U.S. automakers to help develop technology to monitor
and enforce future emissions standards." Oil and Gas Journal v90, n42
(Oct 19, 1992):4.
"Drive+: promoting cleaner and more fuel efficient motor vehicles
through a self-financing system of state sales tax incentives." Journal
of Policy Analysis & Management v9, n3 (Summer, 1990):409
Elmer-DeWitt, Philip. "L.A.'s high-watt highway: electric cars get a
boost in the capital of smog." Time v135, n18 (April 30, 1990):96.
"California mulling credits if firms scrap old cars." (pollution
credits for companies that help prevent air pollution) Wall Street
Journal (Wed, July 22, 1992):B4.
Rose, Frederick. "Unocal is seeking tired, older autos of Los Angeles
area; voluntary, $5 million program to scrap clunkers aims at cutting
air pollution." Wall Street Journal (Fri, April 27, 1990):A7B
B. Land Use.
"Will Land-use planning solve our environmental problems?"
Environmental Forum 6:18-26 July/August 1989 [re: SCAQMD plan]
Rohter, Larry. "Now, the urban sprawl wonder diet." New York Times v138
(Sat, Dec 24, 1988):4.
"A small but welcome parcel." (United Parcel Services to convert trucks
to natural gas) Los Angeles Times v109 (Thu, July 12, 1990):B6.
Clifford, Frank. "AQMD officials back off from commuter fee plan." Los
Angeles Times v109 (Sat, July 7, 1990):A1.
Lee, Patrick. "AQMD says utility merger would increase L.A. smog." Los
Angeles Times v109 (Sat, June 2, 1990):A32.
Wells, Ken. "California mulls tying auto tax to emissions." Wall Street
Journal (Mon, May 7, 1990):B1.
C. Industrial Location.
Weber, Jonathan. "Orange County is home base to smogbusters." (reducing
air pollution at industrial plants) Los Angeles Times v108 (Sun, Oct
22, 1989):D1
Lents, James M. "Businesses running away from smog will not cleanse
L.A.'s air. Los Angeles Times v109 (Sun, Sept 16, 1990):M5
Weber, Jonathan. "Orange County is home base to smogbusters." (reducing
air pollution at industrial plants) Los Angeles Times v108 (Sun, Oct
22, 1989):D1
E. Social Impacts
Novick, Michael. "The WATCHDOG." (grass-roots, multi racial, working
class Los Angeles, CA group focusing on air pollution) EPA Journal v18,
n1 (March-April, 1992):51 (2 pages).
Bernard, Mitchell S.; Green, Carolyn L. "Toxic air is inner city's
silent menace; urban environmentalism means seeing pollution as a form
of economic injustice." (Column) Los Angeles Times v111 (Mon, July 20,
1992):B5
Candaele, Kelly. "Why should only workers have to pay for less polluted
air?" Los Angeles Times v111 (Sun, Feb 23, 1992):M6.
Pincetl, Stephanie. "Must a clean environment come at the cost of
jobs?" (California Air Resources Board plans to regulate industrial
pollution) Los Angeles Times v108, secII (Thu, June 29, 1989):7.
END NOTES
(1) Mumme, Stephen P. "Clearing the Air on Environmental Reform in
Mexico." Environment volume 33 number 10; December 1991, p. 9
(2) Duane, Timothy. "Environmental planning and Policy in a Post-Rio
World." Berkeley Planning Journal, Spring, 1993, p. 32.
(3) Duane, p. 39.
(4) Duane, p. 42.
(5) Duane, p. 45.
(6) "Facts About Air Pollution and Health," California Air Resources
Board pamphlet, p. 4.
(7) Duane, p. 48.
(8) Wald, Matthew L. "Recharting war on smog: in shift from 70's,
pollution controls begin in states, then are adopted by Washington."
New York Times v139 (Tue, Oct 10, 1989) p. A1.
(9) EPA Journal, May/June 1992, p. 9.
(10) Laver, Ross. Maclean's, March 26, 1990, p. 41.
(11) Scott, David Clark. "Streamlining Mexico's bloated oil monopoly."
Christian Science Monitor vol.84, no.145 (Mon, June 22, 1992), p. 7
(12) Laver, p. 42
(13) Miller, Marjorie. "Mexico City's smoogy air obscuring mayor's
future." Los Angeles Times vol. 111, April 11, 1992, p. A3.
(14) Uhlig, Mark. "Refinery Closing Outrages Mexican Workers." New York
Times vol.140, March 27, 1991, p. A11.
(15) Darling, Juanita. "Plan to break up Mexico's oil giant wins final
OK." Los Angeles Times v111 (Tue, June 16, 1992):D3, col 1, 14 col in.
UCB NewsMicro NEWSFILM
(16) Edward Camarena, personal communication.
(17) Scott, David Clark. "Streamlining Mexico's bloated oil monopoly."
(state owned Pemex oil company under pressure to end monopoly)
Christian Science Monitor v84, n145 (Mon, June 22, 1992):7
(18) Downer, Stephen. "Mexico City targets autos in air plan."
Automotive News, n5363 (Oct 22, 1990):4.
(19) Conger, Lucy. "Foul Facts in a Polluted City." Maclean's, p. 44.
(20) Mumme, p. 11.
(21) Edward Camarena, personal communication.
(22) Thompson, Mark. "Fighting for cleaner air: the use of automobiles
must be regulated if Los Angeles is to win its war against smog."
Atlantic v262, n3 (Sept, 1988):20.
(23) "California air board adopts a broad plan to counter pollution."
New York Times v138 (Wed, August 16, 1989): A12(N).
(24) Stammer, Larry B. "Clean-air plan vote delayed for 60 days." Los
Angeles Times v108, (Sat, June 24, 1989): secI, 1.
(25) "For regional government." (editorial) Los Angeles Times v108,
secII (Sat, Sept 23, 1989):8.
(26) Golden, Tim. "Mexican President Outlines Program For Changes." New
York Times vol. 120, November 2, 1991,
and Uhlig, Mark. "Gasping, Mexicans Act to Clear the Capital's Air."
New York Times vol. 120, January 23, 1991, p. A12.
(27) Clifford, Frank. "From out of the smog emerges a 4-day week."
(possible means to cutting down on automobile emission pollution) Los
Angeles Times v108, secI (Sat, June 17, 1989):1.
(28) Zelenko, Laura. "Traffic and pollution create satellite offices."
American Demographics v14, n6 (June, 1992):26.
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